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The Role of Liability, Regulation and Economic Incentives in 
Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment:  




We examine different market-based mechanisms and other incentives intended to 
promote the environmental remediation and reuse of brownfields. Policies that   
encourage cleanup and re-use of brownfields offer real estate developers reductions in 
regulatory burden, relief from liability for future cleanups once certain mitigation 
standards are met, and/or financial support for regeneration of brownfields.  
We use conjoint choice experiments—a stated preference approach—to assess the 
responses of real estate developers to different mixes of these incentives. Our survey 
instrument was administered in person to a sample of developers and real estate 
professionals randomly intercepted at the Marché International des Professionnels de 
l’Immobilier (MIPIM) in Cannes, France, in March 2002. 
Conditional and random-coefficient logit models of the responses to the choice 
questions indicate that developers find sites with contamination problems less attractive 
than others, and that they value liability relief. This confirms our expectation that 
contaminated sites are less desirable because of the associated cleanup costs, but refutes 
earlier claims that liability does not matter. Our developers are not deterred by prior 
contamination, once it has been cleaned up, suggesting that “contamination stigma” is 
not very important, and appreciate fast-track review of development and remediation 
plans, direct financial incentives, and flexible (negotiable) cleanup standards. 
Developers with prior experience with contaminated sites are more responsive to the 
policies than are inexperienced developers, especially for subsidies. Inexperienced 
developers are more responsive to liability relief and regulatory relief than they are to 
subsidies. Similar considerations hold true for larger developers. 
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I. Introduction  
 
  This study examines different market-based mechanisms and other incentives intended to 
promote the environmental remediation and reuse of “brownfields.” Brownfields are 
“abandoned, idled or underused industrial and commercial properties where real or perceived 
contamination complicates expansion or redevelopment” (Simons, 1998).  
  Brownfields were created through two concurrent factors: the downsizing and plant 
closings that started in the 1970s as the economy of the US and of Western European countries 
moved away from manufacturing, and the passage of legislation that holds responsible parties 
liable for the cost of cleanup at contaminated sites. It  is often argued that such legislation, 
including the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA, 1980) in the US, has created potential disincentives to the redevelopment and reuse 
of potentially contaminated sites, as liability for the cost of cleanup has been construed to extend 
to lenders and homeowners (Fogleman, 1992).  
  Observers believe that fear of liability can have both direct and indirect effects on 
brownfield development. The direct effects are that developers m ay shy away from properties 
believed to be contaminated for fear of  future liability and because immediate cleanup costs may 
prove too high for the development project to be viable. Regarding indirect effects, developers 
may fear that lenders deny financing for brownfield projects to avoid involvement in liability at 




speculated that “contamination stigma” may raise the uncertainty about demand for or reduce the 
revenue from the sale of contaminated sites. 
  Brownfield cleanup and reuse are attractive to communities and policymakers for three 
reasons. First, brownfield cleanup reduces the adverse effects of the site’s soil and water 
pollution on human health and ecological systems. Second, the reuse of brownfields helps stop 
the conversion of agricultural land and rural sites to urban uses and other development patterns 
that generate environmental problems, congestion and sprawl. Third, redeveloping abandoned 
industrial sites promotes economic growth in inner cities and is, therefore, a potentially 
important component of sustainable growth. 
The promise of brownfield redevelopment for encouraging cleanup and helping to 
regenerate inner city areas has attracted considerable attention in federal, state, and local circles.  
In the US, for example, in an effort to mitigate the disincentives created by CERCLA, the States 
have passed programs offering entrepreneurs and prospective redevelopers (a) reductions in 
regulatory burdens, (b) relief from liability for future cleanups and environmental damage once 
certain mitigation standards are met, and/or (c) financial support for regeneration of brownfields.  
By late 2000, forty-seven states had instituted voluntary cleanup programs to promote reuse and 
cleanup of contaminated sites (Bartsch and Dorfman 2000; Meyer and VanLandingham 2000). 
Similar initiatives are under consideration in several European countries, and voluntary cleanup 
agreements have been signed and are being implemented at several locales.  
We examine the value of interventions and policies targeting brownfields from the 
perspective of the key actors involved—private real estate developers. In this paper we ask three 
related questions: First, what economic incentives can be offered to developers to encourage 




have been offered for decades to economic agents, little empirical evidence exists documenting 
the impact of (a), (b) and (c) on brownfield cleanup and investments.  
Second, what kind of site characteristics and available infrastructure make a parcel 
attractive for cleanup and reuse, and to what kind of developers? If sites/developers can be 
identified that are more likely  candidates for development, this may allow more effective 
targeting of policies based on economic incentives and liability or regulatory relief. Third, are 
developers truly influenced by “contamination stigma”, i.e. a parcel’s loss of value due to its 
potential or past contamination even if remediation has already taken place at the site? 
To answer these questions, we survey real estate developers using conjoint choice 
questions. Our survey questionnaire presents respondents with pairs and triplets of 
redevelopment projects, where each project is defined by site attributes (location, contamination, 
availability of transportation) and applicable policies. Our policy mix attributes consist of (a) 
liability relief, (b) direct financial incentives, (c) and regulatory relief, in the form of fast-track 
approvals of plans and flexible cleanup standards. The survey was administered in person to a 
sample of developers and real estate professionals randomly intercepted at the Marché 
International des Professionnels de l’Immobilier (MIPIM) in Cannes, France, in March 2002.  
Conditional logit models of the responses to the choice questions indicate that developers 
find sites with contamination problems less attractive than others, and that they value liability 
relief. This confirms our expectation that contaminated sites are less desirable because of the 
associated cleanup costs, but refutes earlier claims (Urban Institute et al., 1997) that liability does 
not matter. Our developers are not deterred by prior contamination, once it has been cleaned up, 




review of development and remediation plans, direct financial incentives, and flexible 
(negotiable) cleanup standards.  
We investigate the preferences of specific groups of developers, finding that developers 
with prior experience with contaminated sites are more responsive to financial incentives than 
other developers (and less deterred by contamination). Large firms are somewhat l ess responsive 
to financial incentives, but similar to other firms in their responses to other policies and site 
attributes. Specialization in residential or industrial projects does not result in different 
preferences for site attribute and policy mix, whereas developers who sell their development 
projects to other parties attach a greater value to government-granted liability relief.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides some background 
information about brownfields. Section III describes the survey instrument, the conjoint choice 
questions and the administration of the survey. Section IV discusses how economic incentives 
can influence the profitability of brownfield redevelopment projects, and presents the 
econometric model of the responses, the variables and the hypotheses. Section V presents the 
results, and section VI provides concluding remarks. 
 
II. Background. 
A. How Did Brownfields Originate? 
The problem of brownfields is the result of two concurrent factors: the n umerous plant 
closings and downsizing that started in the 1970s as the US and Western Europe experienced a 
structural change of their economies away from manufacturing, and the passage of 





In the US, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(1980, re-authorized and amended in 1986) holds parties that are responsible for the creation of 
contaminated sites liable for the cost of cleaning up those sites. Since responsible parties are 
sought among the owners and operators of the sites, liability has in some cases been construed to 
apply to those persons who acquire contaminated land, and to lenders that foreclose on 
contaminated properties.  
  Many observers believe that the fear of liability keeps investors away from brownfield 
properties. Fear of liability can have both direct and indirect effects on brownfield development. 
Developers might shy away from properties believed to  be contaminated for fear of  future 
liability, and because immediate cleanup costs may prove too high for the development project to 
be viable. These may be interpreted as the direct effects of liability. Regarding indirect effects, 
developers may fear that lenders deny financing for brownfield projects to avoid involvement in 
liability at the site, and/or undervalue the property as a collateral for the loan. In addition, it is 
often speculated that “contamination stigma” may raise the uncertainty about demand for or 
reduce the revenue from the sale of contaminated sites.
2 
The most widely cited source of information about the number of brownfield sites in the 
US is a study by the General Accounting Office (1995), which estimates that there are 130,000 to 
450,000 contaminated commercial and industrial sites in the US.
3 In Europe estimates of the size 
                                                                 
2 Contamination stigma is defined as “a market imposed penalty that can affect a property that is known or suspected 
to be contaminated, a property that was once contaminated but is now considered clean, or a never contaminated 
property located in proximity to a contaminated property” (Dybvig, 1992). Chan (2002) discusses other definitions 
of stigma, and refers to it as “the detrimental impact on property value due to the presence of a risk perception 
driven market resistance.” 
3 For comparison, the US Conference of Mayors (1996) estimates that there are 43,000 acres of browfields in 16,000 
sites among the 39 cities surveyed, including about 20 larger cities with population over 100,000. One problem with 
this figure, however, is that the definition of brownfield varies across cities.  Simons (1998) reports that as of 1994 
brownfields in 31 US cities add to a total of 115,000 acres. Other estimates of the number of brownfields can be 
formed by examining the list of contaminated sites compiled by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
and state agencies under various environmental programs. For examples, the EPA maintains a registry of active 




of the problem  vary dramatically across countries, depending on the definition of brownfield 
(Grimski and Ferber, 1998). With this caveat, Germany reportedly has 3 5,000 contaminated 
sites, mostly concentrated in former Eastern Germany (Meyer, Williams and Yount, 1995) for a 
total of 128,000 hectares (Grimski and Ferber, 1998). In reports to the European Union, the 
Netherlands claimed to have over 6,000 contaminated  sites, Italy 5,400, France 800 and Spain 
only 94 (Meyer, Williams and Yount, 1995).    
Other reports (Giangrasso and Tassoni, 2001) peg the number of sites suspected to be 
contaminated in Europe at the end of the 1980s at roughly 150,000, for a total of more than 100 
million hectares, 20 million of which in Western Europe. 
 
B. Contaminated Site Policies 
  In the US, where federal legislation addressing contaminated sites was passed over 20 
years ago (CERCLA, 1980), state programs were recently established to encourage cleanup and 
redevelopment of potentially contaminated sites by offering liability relief, regulatory relief, 
simplified cleanup standards, and direct financial incentives to developers. Liability relief 
usually comes in the form of letters of no  further action, certificates of cleanup completion, or 
covenants not to sue. The latter is generally the strongest form of liability relief, since it is 
essentially a contract by which the granting agency (usually the state’s department of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
placed on CERCLIS and subsequently delisted because the site was cleaned up, or was found not be contaminated in 
the first place. The EPA also maintains a registry documenting roughly 418,000 Leaking Underground Storage 
Tanks (LUSTs) (http://www.epa.gov/swerust1/cat/index.htm). On adding up several registries of contaminated sites, 
and correcting for sites that appear simultaneously on more than one registry, the total number of brownfields in the 






environmental protection) commits not to sue the property owner, as long as the cleanup of the 
parcel (or any residual contamination) meets certain requirements.
4  
  Some European countries crafted their own Superfund-like legislation to avoid some of 
the perverse effects  of liability on real estate development. In the Netherlands, for example, an 
innocent landowner disclaim exists, and in some cases the municipality may take over the 
expenses of remediation. In addition, in some European countries there has been much reliance 
on voluntary cleanup initiatives. For instance, in France (Lèvêque, 1996) much of the self-
regulation of the chemical industry was launched in hopes of preventing the passage of an act 
similar to CERCLA, which was debated by the Parliament during the 1990s.   
In Italy, cleanup legislation exists ( Decreto [Executive Order]  Ronchi, approved in 
February 1997), but liability is not retroactive. As a consequence, at certain locales polluters 
have entered into voluntary agreements with the government. For example, in 1998 the City of 
Venice and several Ministries entered into a voluntary agreement with a number of chemical 
firms and other parties over cleanup at the industrial site of Marghera. Firms committed to 
increasing the safety standards of plants, reducing emissions, maintaining the existing levels of 
employment, gradually cleaning up abandoned facilities, and adopting voluntary environmental 
certification (ISO or EMAS), in exchange for a more cooperative attitude on the part of 
government agencies, an  informal guarantee of no lawsuits, quicker approvals of projects, and 
public monies in support of firms’ improvement projects and to overhaul infrastructure. For 
certain aspects, this agreement is, therefore, very similar to voluntary cleanup programs and 
brownfield initiatives in the US. 
   
                                                                 
4 Memoranda of understanding may be signed by the state and the US EPA through which the latter recognizes the 




C. Effects of liability and contamination on parcel prices and development 
Despite the claims about effects of liability on acquisition and development of 
browfields, little empirical work has been done to assess the existence and magnitude of these 
effects, and the impacts, if any, of voluntary cleanup and brownfields programs. To our 
knowledge, no study has attempted to relate the establishment of such programs to land prices or 
has sought to evaluate the impact of the  various policy instruments to the number of parcels 
cleaned up and redeveloped and/or their location.  
Urban Institute et al. (1997) rely on interviews, mostly of qualitative nature, of 
developers to investigate a number of claims about the deterrent effect of contamination and 
liability, and possible policies for brownfields redevelopment. McGrath (2000) estimates a 
switching regression model that relates the redevelopment of a parcel, and a parcel’s sale price, 
to physical characteristics of the site and  to its probability of being contaminated. This model 
assumes that the likelihood of redevelopment is affected by the odds of contamination both via 
the price of the parcel and through an independent effect. Howland (2000) combines information 
on contamination and sale prices reported by owners of parcels in an industrial area of Baltimore 
with state records, finding that contamination reduces the sale price, but does not slow down 
transactions. This study, however, was completed before the passage of Maryland’s Voluntary 
Cleanup program, and thus cannot establish the effects of the latter on the prices and the rate of 
turnover of contaminated property. 
Lacking evidence about the response of developers to brownfield contamination and 
policies, we turn to stated preference approaches to answer the following questions. First, what 
economic incentives can be offered to developers to encourage cleanup and reuse of brownfields, 
and how effective are they? Second, what kind of site characteristics and available infrastructure 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 




make a parcel attractive for cleanup and reuse, and to what kind of developers? Third, are 
developers truly influenced by contamination stigma, whereby a parcel’s possible or actual 
contamination results in its lower desirability? 
  
III. Structure of the Questionnaire and Survey Administration 
A. Conjoint choice questions. 
In our survey, we ask a sample of real estate developers to tell us which they prefer 
between two hypothetical alternative redevelopment projects, A and B, where each project i s 
described by site attributes (e.g., location and contamination) and a policy mix.
5  
The policy mix includes (a) l iability reduction in the form of a certificate of assurance 
that the developer is not going to be held responsible for future cleanups; (b) regulatory relief in 
the form of a faster notice of approvals and/or flexible (negotiable) cleanup standards; and (c) 
direct financial incentives to the developer.    
These policies may affect different components of the costs and revenues associated with 
redeveloping the site. Liability relief, for example, reduces or eliminates the risk of future 
liability for cleanup costs, as long as the developer meets certain requirements. It may, in 
addition, help raise the revenue from the sale or rental of the site by avoiding the stigma due to 
existing or suspected contamination. For this attribute, we consider two possible levels: (a) 
certificate of assurance not available, and (b) certificate of assurance available upon completion 
of remediation.  
                                                                 
5 As explained in Section III.B, each of these choice questions is followed by another where the respondent is asked 





Faster response times by the agency to the developer’s application should reduce the 
costs of the project.
6 We use two levels of this attribute, setting response times within 6 months, 
and 24 months, respectively, of the date of the application. 
Direct financial incentives can take the form of low-cost loans, tax credits, and cash 
rebates. In our survey, however, we do not specify what form they can take, and simply tell our 
respondents that they are for 10%, 20% and 30% of the value of the project.
7 
We reason that different policy mixes can have different appeal to developers, depending 
on the attributes of the site where the (re-)development project is undertaken. Accordingly, we 
include three more attributes to describe the project: the presence of contamination at the site, the 
availability of transportation networks near the site, and the presence of a city within 20 km of 
the site to capture access to markets and suppliers.  
Regarding contamination, each alternative is characterized by one of three possibilities: 
(a)  no contamination, (b) contamination, or (c) the site was previously contaminated but 
remediation has taken place. The latter level of the attribute allows us to check for developers’ 
fears of contamination stigma even after the parcel is cleaned up. Finally, all sites are assumed to 
have regular access to highways, with some alternatives also served by rail, an airport, and a 
harbor. 
 
B. Structure of the Questionnaire. 
                                                                 
6 They may also eliminate some of the uncertainty typically associated with undertaking brownfield projects. Earlier 
research in this area (Urban Institute et al., 1997) suggests that reducing uncertainty may be an important component 
of effective brownfield programs. 
7 These figures were based on a review of the legislation and programs in Italy and other European countries, and 
are similar to the levels of public subsidies in the US. Simons (1998) examines the role of public assistance and 
subsidies in a number of brownfield projects in the US. He finds that the average public subsidy is 20 percent. For 
comparison, remediation costs were typically 10 percent of a project’s total value, but some projects using 




The interview begins with a series of screening questions intended to determine whether 
the respondent (i) is a developer,
8 (ii) works for a private company, a non-profit organization, or 
a government agency, and (iii) his/her company’s principal business is within the real estate 
development market.  
The questionnaire is comprised of four sections. The first section gathers more specific 
information on the business of the respondent’s company, such as the typical project the 
company is involved in and its revenue. In this section the respondent is also asked whether 
his/her company has ever purchased, leased or developed sites located in industrial areas, or 
contaminated sites.  
  Section 2 provides information on cleanup responsibilities, highlights the advantages and 
disadvantages of developing contaminated sites, and describes the incentives  available in some 
countries to encourage re-development of previously used sites. The respondent is then asked 
whether he is familiar with the cleanup legislation of the countries where his/her company does 
its business, and whether his/her company has ever benefited from financial assistance from the 
government for redeveloping used sites.  
  Section 3 is comprised of four conjoint choice exercises. Each exercise describes two 
hypothetical development projects (Site A and Site B). Each site is described by  seven attributes: 
(i) presence/absence of contamination; (ii) cleanup standards; (iii) availability of transportation 
network within 20 km from the site; (iv) presence/absence of a certificate issued by a 
government agency that relieves the developer from  liability for further cleanup; (v) time for 
approval of development/cleanup plans by the appropriate government agency; (vi) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
concludes that public subsidies are generally too high, and tend to support development costs other than the costs of 
remediation. 
8 Both developers and real estate consultants took the survey. The latter were instructed to answer the questions as if 




presence/absence of a city within 20 km; and (vii) government financial incentives, expressed as 
percentage of the value of the project. In each choice exercise, Site A differs from Site B in the 
level of two or more attributes. For each pair, the respondent is first asked which project he/she 
finds more attractive between A and B, and then is asked to choose between A, B and the option 
of not participating in either project. Figure 1 displays an example of conjoint choice question. 
  Finally, section 4 gathers further information about the position of the respondent within 
his/her company, and asks whether he/she takes part in the final investment decision about a real 
estate development project (or collaborates with the committee that makes the final decision). 
The respondent is asked to report the number of employees of his/her company and the 2001 
level of sales. Other individual characteristics of the respondents, such as age and schooling, are 
also collected.  
   
C. Administration of the Survey Instrument. 
A preliminary draft of the survey questionnaire was tested on a focus group of 
developers, real estate professionals, and members of the public sector in the Venice area on 22 
February, 2002. The purpose of the focus group was to test respondent comprehension of the 
questions and to solicit comments and suggestions about the questionnaire. In general, the 
questionnaire was very well received. Focus group participants were comfortable with the 
conjoint questions, and suggested including questions about the type of projects generally 
undertaken by developers, and about the value of the projects. These suggestions were 




The survey w as administered in person by five professionally trained interviewers at the 
Marché International des Professionnels de l’Immobilier (MIPIM), Europe’s largest international 
commercial property conference, in Cannes, France, on March 12-15, 2002.
9 
10  
During that period we interviewed 293 people randomly intercepted at the conference 
venue; 84.30% of the respondents were from private companies, and 63.82% defined themselves 
as developers. The survey instrument was available in Italian (29% of the respondents), English 
(57%) and French (15%). 
 
IV. The Model and the Data 
A. What are the Determinants of Brownfield Redevelopment? 
  The decision to invest or not to invest in a real estate development project should depend 
on the revenues and costs of the project. Formally, the profit p associated with a project is: 
(1)      F L C R + - - = p , 
where R is revenue, C is cost, L is expected liability costs, and F represents transfers to the 
developer. 
The revenue of a  real estate development project should depend on the characteristics of 
the land to be developed. The presence of contamination can influence the price received by the 
                                                                 
9 MIPIM is held as an annual conference. MIPIM 2002 was one of the busiest ever, with more than 15,000 visitors 
attending from 65 countries, and 4,830 end-users and investors, of which 988 were developer companies and 1,008 
real estate consultants. 
10 We became interested in brownfield policies because there are many abandoned or underused contaminated sites 
in the industrial area of Marghera, near Venice, Italy. Ideally, we would have liked to survey local developers about 
their preferences for parcels at this locale, but were forced to abandon this plan for two reasons. First, we observed 
very little redevelopment activity at this locale. Second, we found it impossible to assemble a comprehensive list of 
developers at the local or national level from which a representative sample could be drawn. Moreover, we worried 
that, even if a representative sample could be obtained, only a very small fraction of developers would have 
previously dealt with contaminated sites, making it difficult for us to identify differences in preferences between 
those who do and do not have prior experience with such sites.  Our MIPIM sample is, therefore, expected to be 
comprised of relatively large developers with international exposure. We also expect a greater proportion of 




developer for the completed project, as can other location characteristics, such as proximity to 
transportation nodes and to a city. 
  Contamination should also influence the  costs associated with the development project, 
raising them because of environmental assessment fees, remediation costs, legal expenses, and 
any other punitive and civil penalties linked to known or anticipated contamination. All of these 
expenses are incurred in addition to normal development costs, and are, presumably, relatively 
well known.  
  In addition, developers may fear liability, the risk that in the future additional costs may 
be incurred as a result of the discovery of previously unknown or unanticipated contamination, 
with the associated litigation and other uncertain events, including possible changes in 
remediation standards.  The costs due to liability are generally thought to be highly uncertain. 
  Government policies can offset some of these components of the costs of development 
projects. They can, for example, offer letters of no further action, certificates of completion, or 
covenants not to sue that reduce or eliminate future liability risks. They can also reduce 
uncertainty about future changes in cleanup standards, and immediate cleanup costs, by offering 
streamlined review of development project plans. Finally, they can offer direct financial 
incentives to the developers in the form of loans, grants, rebates and/or tax credits. 
  Equation (1) can, therefore, be amended to reflect its arguments’ dependence on all of 
these factors:   
(2)   F L C R + - - = ) , ( ) , , ( ) , ( Z C Z X C X C p , 
where C is a vector of variables denoting the presence and severity of contamination, and X is a 
vector of location and site characteristics. C(•) represents development costs, which include (a) 




Z. L, the expected liability costs, should be influenced by the presence and type of contamination 
at the site, C, and by policies offering relief from liability, Z. 
  In our questionnaire, R is set to be equal to the size of the firm’s typical project. If forced 
to choose between two projects, A and B, a developer should choose the one with the higher 
profits. When the choice set also includes the option of not undertaking either investment, 
economic theory holds that the developer would still choose the same project only if the internal 
rate of return associated with it is at least as large as the internal rate of return of alternative 
investments. By contrast, if the net profit of that project is negative and/or the internal rates of 
return of A and B are less than the internal rate of return of alternative investments, the developer 
should choose the “do nothing” option. 
 
 
B. The Econometric Model 
To motivate the statistical analysis of the responses, we assume that respondents select 
the alternative with the  highest profit. We further assume that profits are a linear function of site 
attributes, S, including its possible contamination,
11 and the policy mix:  
(2)   
ij ij ij ij V e a a a + + + =
2 1 0 Z S ,    
where  Z is a vector of indicators and/or continuous variables capturing  the extent of liability 
relief, regulatory relief and financial incentives, respectively, and i denotes the individual and j 
the alternative. If the error terms e are independent and identically distributed and follow the type 
I extreme value distribution, the probability that alternative k is selected out of K alternatives is: 





ij ik k i
1
) exp( ) exp( )   chooses     resp. Pr( a a w w  
                                                                 
11 S is, therefore, comprised of X and C, with X and C defined as in Section IV.A. We term project attributes the 




where w is the vector of alternative-specific attributes and a is the vector of coefficients in (1).
12 
Equation (3) is the contribution to the likelihood in a conditional logit model.  
Once model (3) is estimated, the rate of tradeoff between any two attributes is the ratio of 
their respective  a coefficients. The marginal value of each attribute is computed as the negative 
of the  a coefficient on that attribute, divided by the coefficient on the “price” variable. To allow 
for heterogeneity among the respondents, the vector  w in equation (3) can be augmented to 
include interactions between respondent or firm characteristics, such as its profitability, size and 
the scale of the market it operates in, and the attributes of the alternatives.  
To further allow for heterogeneity—and to relax the assumption of independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) implicitly imposed by the conditional logit model
13—we also 
estimate random-coefficient logit models. In a random-coefficients model, the vector of 
coefficients  b breaks down into two components: its expectation,  b , and a vector of individual-
specific error terms,  ui. The probability of choosing alternative k, given  the realization of the 
individual-specific error ui, is: 



















The individual-specific error term  u creates correlation between the indirect utilities associated 
with the different alternatives, ruling out IIA. 
To compute the unconditional probability of choosing project k one must, therefore, 
integrate equation (4) with respect to the joint density of the vector of error terms u. In practice, 
                                                                 
12 The intercept in equation (2) is not identified and is therefore normalized to zero. 
13 Briefly, IIA, which follows from the assumption that the error term in (2) is i.i.d. type I extreme value, states that 
the ratio between the odds of choosing between any two alternatives does not depend on the attributes of any other 
alternative. If this assumption is violated in the data, the conditional logit model may overpredict the probability of 




estimation of equation (4) requires that assumptions be made about which coefficients are 
random, and about the joint distribution of the individual-specific errors ui.  
 
C. The Choice of Regressors 
Following equations (1)-(3), we fit conditional logit models of the responses to the choice 
questions.  In our basic specification, the probability  of choosing a project depends only on the 
attributes of the alternatives. In subsequent runs, we add interactions intended to test specific 
hypothesis about the attractiveness (or unattractiveness) of the attributes to certain types of 
developers, and then further incorporate random coefficients. 
  We expect the coefficient of the contamination dummy (CONTAM_P) to be negative, 
reflecting the extra development costs associated with cleanup. Urban Institute et al. (1997) 
interview developers and reach the conclusion that it is not the fear of liability that keeps 
investors away, but the high costs of cleanup. We therefore formulate our Hypothesis I, that fear 
of liability does not matter but cleanup costs do. A negative coefficient on CONTAM_P and an 
insignificant coefficient on CERTIFIC, the dummy capturing whether or not a certificate of 
completion is offered, would provide empirical support for this hypothesis. 
The coefficient of CONTAM_C (contamination was present, but has been removed) 
should capture the existence of contamination stigma. We do not have any prior expectations on 
this coefficient. While many observers believe contamination stigma to exist, some recent 
empirical studies (e.g., Urban Institute et al., 1997) refute this notion. Others (Howland,  2000) 
argue that the market adjusts to contamination stigma by lowering the price of contaminated 




II) that there is no contamination stigma. We accept the null hypothesis if the coefficient on 
CONTAM_C is not statistically significant.  
One would expect sites at locales served by more means of transportation to be more 
attractive, all else the same, as should sites located in the proximity of a city. Regarding  the 
policy instruments,  ceteris paribus we would expect direct financial incentives (INCENT), 
shorter response times (OVERS) by the agency to developer application, and the issuance of a 
certificate of completion (CERTIFIC) to increase the attractiveness o f a project. Flexible 
(negotiable) standards (FLEXSTDS) should make a project more attractive, unless developers 
consider negotiation with the authorities lengthy and costly. The net effect is, therefore, an 
empirical issue.  
 
D. Specific Hypotheses and Interaction Terms. 
  As mentioned above, it is likely that some attributes may be more (less) attractive to 
certain types of developers than to others. Testing hypotheses about different impacts of 
attributes on different developers requires the use of interaction terms. 
  We create interactions between several project attributes and a dummy variable denoting 
whether the developer has prior experience with contaminated sites. Various project attributes 
may hold a different appeal to developers with contaminated site experience for several reasons. 
For example, developers with contaminated site experience may have different perceptions of 
cleanup costs, in which case the coefficient of CONTAM_P interacted with the dummy for 
experience with contaminated sites may  partially or even fully offset that of CONTAM_P.  Their 
views of negotiable cleanup standards and of the value of a letter of completion may reflect their 




instruments and contamination appeal to or deter developers with contaminated site experience 
in a different way. 
We also create interactions between selected project attributes and a dummy variable 
denoting whether the firm is a “large” firm, in that revenues are g reater than revenues for the 
average firm. Several effects could be captured into the coefficients of these interactions. Some 
observers believe that large firms have traditionally been the target of EPA enforcement effort 
over Superfund because of their a bility to pay for cleanup. This might make them more reluctant 
to take up contaminated sites, and perhaps more accepting of liability relief. On the other hand, 
large firms presumably rely more on their own financing than on borrowing from banks, which 
might insulate them from the indirect effects of liability through the lenders. Our Hypothesis IV 
is that larger firms have different preferences from smaller firms. 
Developers who deal primarily with industrial and commercial sites may react to 
contamination to a different extent than developers who engage mostly in residential projects. 
This is our Hypothesis V, which could be due to the perception, discussed in Urban Institute et 
al. (1997), that financing costs are higher—and hence the effects of liability through the lenders 
more pronounced—at industrial sites, and to the expectation of higher cash flows at more 
densely developed sites, like residential projects and office buildings. 
We also wonder whether liability (and liability relief schemes) impacts d evelopers 
differently if they are able to transfer the property to others (Hypothesis VI). We create an 
interaction term between CERTIFIC and SELL1 (a dummy that takes on a value of one if the 
developers sells its completed projects to other parties), and examine the sign and significance of 
the coefficient on this interaction.  Finally, Urban Institute et al. (1997) emphasizes the 




interaction between attributes of the project and respondent familiarity with cleanup legislation 
and programs (Hypothesis VII). 
 
V. Results 
A. Characteristics of the Respondents 
Because our sample consists of people randomly intercepted at a professional conference, 
we cannot claim that it i s representative of the universe of developers. Our first order of business 
is, therefore, to examine the characteristics of our respondents. Descriptive statistics for 
respondent characteristics and firm characteristics are reported in Table 1. 
Buying, developing or selling was the principal business of respondents’ company for 
66% of the sample, and 64% defined themselves as developers. About 18% of the people 
interviewed were consultants who advised companies on real estate investment projects. Among 
the developers, about 65% stated that they bought and developed areas in order to sell the final 
projects, 38% to keep them for their business, and 27% to lease them to someone else. 
Roughly 58% of the companies in our sample do business in Southern Europe, 3 0% in 
Northern Europe, 62% in Western Europe, 36% in Eastern Europe, 17% in North America, 
almost 9% in Asia, and 8% in the rest of the world.
14 As one would expect of MIPIM attendees, 
the respondents’ companies are considerably large: The average  number o f employees is 3,733 
people, and average level of sales is about €15,895 million.  The typical project had a minimum 
size of about 231,868 m
2, and a building of at least 29,160 m
2.  Median revenue was €7 million. 
Approximately two-thirds of the respondents had previous experience with industrial 
sites, and 60% of them bought abandoned industrial areas, while 69% worked with industrial 
areas that are still used at the time of the acquisition. In our sample, 47% of the respondents 
                                                                 




stated having previous experience with contaminated sites. In addition, 77% of the respondents 
were familiar with the polluted site cleanup legislation in the countries where their company does 
business. Moreover, 39% of our interviewees reported to have benefited from governmental 
incentives to re-use abandoned areas. 
We also found that in the previous three years the majority of the respondents (74%) had 
undertaken commercial projects, and had dealt with office buildings or complexes (68%). About 
53% of the sample had engaged in residential projects, 49% in industrial projects, and 25% in 
other kind of projects. 
The majority of the respondents were males (82%), and the average age was 42. The 
respondents were highly educated: the majority (88%) had a college degree, and about 10% had 
a master’s degree in business administration or had completed post-graduate work. Almost all of 
the respondents (94%) indicated that they are responsible for gathering information to support 
the decision to undertake a real estate development project, and roughly 79% actually 
participates in making the final decision. 
Because an important policy question is what it takes to draw developers who have never 
worked with brownfields before to engage in brownfields projects, in Table 2 we compare the 
characteristics of brownfields-experienced and inexperienced developers. Developers with 
brownfield experience tend to engage in projects at larger sites and with larger buildings and 
tend to have greater revenues per project.  However, t tests indicate that the differences between 
the two samples are not statistically significant. The primary activity of both experienced and 
inexperienced developers is developing commercial projects, followed by building offices, 





B. Testing for Comprehension of the Choice Task 
In conjoint choice experiments, and whenever survey participants are queried about 
hypothetical, and relatively complex, commodities, it is important to test for respondent 
comprehension of tasks and commodities. 
In informal debriefing conversations after the completion of the interviews, many 
respondents offered spontaneous comments that suggested that they understood the choice task 
and were comfortable with it. Some respondents even volunteered attributes of projects that they 
felt were more important to them than others.  
In addition, we checked our responses for possibly abnormal response patterns. We used 
three criteria. First, we checked whether a disproportionate number of respondents selected the 
“neither project” option when allowed to do so. This might indicate that respondents were 
unwilling to accept the proposed project alternatives, A and B, as reasonable. Our respondents 
chose the “neither project” option in about 20 percent of the choice tasks that offered such an 
alternative, a frequency that seems reasonable.  
Second, following Viscusi et al. (1991), we examined whether there were respondents 
who always chose alternative A or B, or always chose the “neither project” option. It should be 
noted that selecting always answer A (or B) does not  necessarily indicate that the respondent 
failed to trade off the attributes of the alternatives. Even if that were the case, this behavior 
would be limited to a very small fraction of the sample: only 11 respondents (3.7 percent of the 
sample) always preferred alternative A, 11 respondents always preferred alternative B, and 16 
people always preferred the “neither A nor B” option (about 5 percent of the sample).  
Finally, we checked for “preference reversals.” A preference reversal occurs if a 




up choice questions, where he is asked to choose between A, B and the “neither” alternative. 
Once again, the random utility model framework (equations (2) and (3)) accommodates 
occurrences of this kind. In any case, only 8 respondents exhibited this type of behavior. 
Based on these three criteria, we conclude that almost all of our respondents answered the 
choice questions in a reasonable f ashion. For good measure, however, we run our logit models 
first on the full sample, and then after excluding respondents engaging in any of the behaviors 
described in the second and third criterion above.   
 
C. The Conditional Logit Model: Effects of the Attributes 
The purpose of our conditional logit models is to determine what attributes actually 
matter to developers, a task we accomplish by performing statistical tests of significance of the 
associated coefficients. We also wish to estimate the marginal price of each attribute or policy 
mechanism. 
Table 3 reports the results of conditional logit models based on attributes only, without 
interactions, for various subsets of the sample. The first column displays the results for the full 
sample, showing that contamination of the site, as expected, deters investments, and results in a 
lower probability that a project is selected. Interestingly, the coefficient on CONTAM_C is 
positive but insignificant, and is not statistically distinguishable from the coefficient of 
CONTAM_A, which indicates the absence of contamination. Regarding Hypothesis II, we 
therefore conclude that the stated preferences of developers do not provide support for the 
existence of contamination stigma, a result that is in line with claims b y Urban Institute et al. 




Regarding proximity to transportation, the negative sign of HIGHWAY should be 
interpreted to mean that a project is less preferred if only access to highway is available. By 
contrast, access to railroad, an airport and a port increases the attractiveness of a project, 
although the effect of railroad is not statistically significant. The presence of a city nearby is also 
deemed attractive, as shown by the positive and significant coefficient of this dummy indicator.  
We were expecting the size of financial incentives to the developers to be positively 
associated with the likelihood of selecting a project, and indeed this expectation is borne out in 
the data. The coefficient on INCENT is positive and strongly significant.  
The negative coefficient of OVERS implies that longer response times by the agency to 
the developer’s application tend to discourage investment in a project. The coefficient on 
CERTIFIC is positive and strongly significant. Taken together w ith the negative coefficient of 
CONTAM_P, this result implies that developers pay attention to  both immediate cleanup costs 
and future liability, and thus dispels Hypothesis I.  Finally, the availability of negotiable cleanup 
standards is deemed attractive, suggesting that for the most part developers do not associate 
negotiation with the agency with lengthy and costly processes. 
Column (2) of the table refers to a sample that excludes the 8 respondents who exhibited 
preference reversals. The results are very similar and virtually all coefficients are within 10 to 25 
percent of their counterparts in the first column.
15 Likewise, results change very little when 
attention is further restricted to private firms (excluding respondents from government agencies 
or  non-profit organizations), as we do in column (3). Excluding real estate consultants (column 
                                                                 
15 Likelihood-ratio tests confirm that all site characteristics are significant (the likelihood-ratio statistic is 543.8, 
which under the null hypothesis is distributed as a chi square distribution with 8 degrees of freedom) and all policy 
instruments are significant (the likelihood-ratio statistic is 244.8, and the chi square distribution has 4 degrees of 




(4)) also yields generally similar results, except for the contamination dummy, whose coefficient 
becomes stronger.   
 
D. The Conditional Logit Model: Interaction Terms 
Tables 4 -7 report the results of conditional logit models that include interactions between 
attributes and characteristics of respondents. Attention is restricted to the sample purged of the 
eight cases of possible preference reversals.  
Table 4 displays the results of the interactions between site or policy attributes and a 
dummy variable indicating whether the respondent’s company has prior experience with 
contaminated sites. A likelihood ratio test (the LR statistic is 44.84, which falls in the 1% upper 
tail of the chi square with 5 degrees of freedom) suggests that the interaction terms do 
significantly improve the fit of the model, and provides support for Hypothesis III, even though 
only one of the coefficients on the interaction terms is individually statistically significant at the 
1% level (another is statistically significant at the 10% level).  
Specifically, developers with contaminated site experience appear to be more sensitive to 
the size of the financial incentives offered by the government than other developers: the 
coefficient that applies to these developers is (0.0119+0.0335)=0.0454, whereas that for all other 
developers is 0.0119. This implies that—all else the same—increasing the incentive by the same 
amount raises the probability of selecting a site more than for developers with experience than 
for developers without prior contaminated site experience. Developers with contaminated site 
experience also appear to be somewhat less deterred by the presence of contamination (the 
coefficient on this attribute is [ -1.2104+0.2654]=-0.945, roughly three-quarters that for all other 




Table 5 displays the results of the model with interactions between attributes and a 
dummy equal to one if the respondent’s company has sales for more than the average level of 
sales in the sample. The likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all 
interactions are equal to zero is 10.22, failing to reject the null hypothesis at the conventional 
levels and providing little evidence for Hypothesis IV.  
However, two interaction coefficients—that on the interaction with the size of the 
financial incentives, and that on the interaction with response times by  the agency in charge—are 
individually statistically significant at the 1% and 10% level, respectively. They imply that larger 
firms are less responsive to financial incentives, and less deterred by slower response times by 
the agency. For large firms, the  relevant coefficient is (0.0347-0.0205)=0.0142, whereas for 
smaller firms it is 0.0347. Larger firms, however, do not value the existence of contamination 
and liability relief differently from smaller firms, despite their potentially larger exposure to 
liability. We also experimented with changing the definition of large firm, finding that, when a 
firm with revenues greater than that of the median firm was classified as a large firm, results 
were qualitatitively similar, but the differences between larger a nd smaller firms were no longer 
statistically significant.  
Table 6 shows that developers who generally sell the properties they develop particularly 
appreciate the opportunity to receive a certificate of completion relieving them of liability, but 
are not different from other developers in terms of their reaction to the presence of contamination 
at the site. Table 6 also reveals that, in contrast to opinions voiced by some observers, primary 
involvement with residential or industrial is  not likely to change the deterrent effect of 




Finally, table 7 implies that those respondents more familiar with contaminated site 
legislation are slightly less deterred by the presence of contamination and by slower response 
times by the agency, but distrust  negotiable cleanup standards. The magnitude of the coefficients 
on the interaction terms, however, implies that in practice the differences between respondents 
that are and are not familiar with the applicable cleanup legislation are negligible.  
Other interaction terms between attributes of the alternative and characteristics of the 
respondents and/or the respondent’s firm were attempted and included in additional runs of the 
conditional logit model. For example, in runs not reported we examined whether respondents 
who have previously received incentives from the government have different preferences for 
contaminated sites and government financial assistance. We found that these developers are 
indeed more responsive to financial incentives, as the coefficient on financial incentives that 
applies to them is roughly one-half that for all other developers. They do not, however, have a 
different perception of the contamination problem. 
 
E. Random Coefficient Models 
To further account for heterogeneity of preferences across individual respondents, we 
allowed some coefficients to be random in the models with interactions between type of 
developer and attributes of the project. In this section, we discuss the results of random-
coefficient models with interactions between attributes and prior experience with contaminated 
sites. We began with allowing the coefficients of all interaction terms to be random, assuming 
that each such coefficient is normally distributed and independent of the others,
16 but found that 
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suited for situations where individuals may attach a different value to the attributes, but all individual valuations 




only one of these coefficients, that on INCENT·experience with contamination, should be 
concluded to be random.   
When the model is re-run imposing that the latter coefficient be random and normally 
distributed, and all others be non-stochastic, its expected value is estimated to be 0.0422 (s.e. 
0.0092), and its standard deviation to be 0.0474. The corresponding coefficient for the remainder 
of developers is 0.0104. This implies that for roughly 74% of the developers with contaminated 
site experience the coefficient on the financial incentive is greater than that for developers 
without contaminated site experience, and that for about 50% of the developers with 
contaminated site experience this coefficient is greater than 0.0422. All other coefficients are 
very similar to those of the conditional logit model of table 4, column (2), and the predictions for 
the probabilities of choosing between alternatives and the estimated marginal prices of the 
attributes are virtually identical to those of the conditional logit model of table 4, column (2). In 
the next two sections, therefore, we report predicted probabilities and marginal prices based on 
the conditional logit. 
 
F. Magnitude of the effects 
To illustrate the magnitude of the effects of the policies, we consider two sites, A and B, 
respectively, and compute the probability of choosing between them under various assumptions. 
Throughout this exercise, we assume that A is a contaminated site located close to all 
transportation modes and near a city, and that individual policies or combinations of them are 
offered at this site. By contrast, B is a pristine site with no applicable brownfield policies, but of 
comparable location characteristics.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
normal allows some individuals to attach a positive value, and others to attach a negative value, on the attribute in 




The resulting probability of choosing A, the contaminated site accompanied by the policy 
mix, is shown in table 8 for various policy mixes for the entire sample and for various types of 
developers.
17 The first column shows the probability of selecting site A for all developers in our 
sample. With financial assistance for 10% of the project revenue, a developer chooses A, the 
contaminated site, with probability 27.33%. This probability increases to 33.10% when the 
financial assistance is doubled. Liability relief alone will imply a probability of selecting A of 
33.67%, which jumps to 46.76% when financial aid worth 20% of the project revenue is added. 
On further adding flexible cleanup standards, the likelihood of choosing the contaminated site 
project further increases to about 54%. It should also be noted that flexible cleanup standards 
alone imply a probability of selecting A of about 27%, and are thus roughly equivalent to 
offering financial assistance for 10% the value of the project.  
As shown in columns 2 and 3 of table 8, there is a substantial difference in the propensity 
to engage in projects at contaminated sites between those developers who already have 
experience with this kind of sites, and those who do not. Specifically, when attention is restricted 
to financial assistance, developers with previous activity at contaminated site have a higher 
probability of selecting the contaminated site at the lowest possible level of financial assistance 
(33.43% versus 21.62%), and are more responsive to an increase in financial assistance. 
Doubling the size of the subsidies to 20% raises the probability of opting for the contaminated 
site to 44.19% for developers with contaminated experience, but has little effect on developers 
with no contaminated site experience, for whom the probability of project A is now only 23.70%. 
On further incorporating liability relief, the probability of choosing A is 59% for 
developers with contaminated site experience, and 35.77% for developers without contaminated 
site experience. This suggest that liability experience is more important than subsidies for 
                                                                 




developers with no previous contamination experience, at least within the normal subsidy 
range.
18  
It is interesting that the likelihood of selecting A is similar for the two types of developers 
when the only policy instrument is flexible cleanup standards. Finally, on combining 20% 
financial assistance, liability relief and flexible cleanup standards, the model predicts that the two 
types of developers will have probabilities of selecting A equal to 64% and 44%, respectively. 
  Comparison between larger and smaller firms suggests that they are similar in terms of 
their preferences for liability relief and flexible cleanup standards. They do differ, however, in 
terms of their responsiveness to financial incentives. Larger firms have a lower probability of 
selecting A at all levels of the subsidy. When offered a policy package that includes a 20-percent 
subsidy, flexible cleanup standards and liability relief, for larger firms the likelihood of selecting 
project A is about 46%, whereas for smaller firms this probability is 58%. 
Similar calculations (not reported in Table 8) show that developers who generally sell the 
properties they develop particularly appreciate the opportunity to receive a certificate of 
completion relieving them of liability. A developer who sells his project to other parties has a 
predicted probability of 38.7% of choosing the contaminated site, A, in the presence of liability 
relief alone. This probability grows to 52.2% when a 20% financial incentive is also offered. For 
developers who do not sell their projects to others, the corresponding probabilities are 26.4% and 
38.4%, respectively. Finally, familiarity with the relevant legislation appears to reduce the appeal 
of distrust negotiable cleanup standards, but this effect is weak: given the choice between a 
contaminated site, A, where negotiable cleanup standards are offered, and a completely pristine 
                                                                 
18 These results are confirmed when our preferred specification of the random coefficient logit model is used. 
Specifically, for developers with prior experience at contaminated sites the probability of preferring A is 34.07% 
with a 10% subsidy, 46.68% for a 20% subsidy, 59.50% with 20% subsidy and liability relief, 35.98% with liability 




site, the probability of selecting the former is about 27.2% for those respondents who are familiar 
with the cleanup legislation, and 27.63% for t hose who said that they were not acquainted with 
such legislation. 
 
G. Marginal prices 
Table 9 displays the marginal prices of the attributes for the sample as a whole and for 
specific groups of developers, based on the median value of a project ( €7 million). The table 
shows that the presence of contamination is worth  €2.5 million, in the sense that, all else the 
same, developers would require financial assistance for  €2.5 million for a €7 million project 
involving a contaminated site where remediation has  not been undertaken yet.
19 An alternative 
interpretation is that developers would be willing to sacrifice up to 2.5 million  € to obtain a 
pristine site. This accounts for almost 37% of the revenue of the project. There is, however, 
much variability in the v alue of avoiding contamination between different types of developers. 
Developers with contaminated site experience, for instance, would require only  €1.46 million, 
smaller developers €2 million, and larger developers €5 million.  
The certification of completion, which exempts the developer from future liability over 
contamination at the site, is worth about  €1.5 million, implying that developers would sacrifice 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
subsidy, and 63.94% when liability relief is further added. The corresponding probabilities for a developers without 
contamination experience are 21.13%, 22.94%, 34.64%, 30.05%, 25.48%, 29.67%, and 42.89%. 
19 To interpret the concept of implicit marginal price of each attribute in this context, consider the indirect utility 
function in section IV.A, which is equal to profits. Profits are assumned to be p=R-C(Cont,X)-L(Cont)+F, where C 
is development costs, L is liability costs, F is transfers to the developer and Cont is a dummy equal to one if the site 
is contaminated. Consider the expected profit associated with a pristine site: p0=R-C(Cont=0,X)-L(Cont=0). In the 
absence  of contamination, it is reasonable to assume that L(Cont=0)=0, reducing expected profit to  p0=R-
C(Cont=0,X). We wish to calculate the payment F that must be made to the developer for him or her to undertake a 
project at a site of identical characteristics, but where contamination exists. The expected profit with contamination 
and financial assistance is  p1=R-C(Cont=1,X)-L(Cont=1)+F. Because the respondent is asked to consider sites with 
equal revenue, R is identical across projects. Indifference between the two sites will be reached when the difference 
in profits is zero:  Dp=p1-p0=[C(Cont=1,X)-C(Cont=0,X)]-L(Cont=1)+F=0. This yields F=[C(Cont=1,X)-




this amount to secure a letter of completion by the appropriate government agency.
20 This is 
approximately 21% of the revenue from the project. This time, it appears that developers with no 
experience at contaminated sites are willing to pay  more to obtain one such a letter (€3.4 million 
v. €0.9 million of developers with experience). 
Our model also implies that each month of delay in the approval of cleanup plans is 
worth  €108,000. It is interesting that developers who have previously engaged in projects at 
contaminated sites and smaller developers attach lower values to a delay of one month in the 
agency’s response time (€59,000 and €96,000, respectively). 
Finally, the marginal price of flexible standards is  €738,000, implying that respondents 
would pay this amount to have the opportunity to negotiate the cleanup standards with the 
government agency.  This figure represents roughly ten percent of the value of the project here 
considered (€7 million).   
 
VI. Conclusions.  
  We have employed conjoint choice experiments to investigate real estate developers’ 
preferences for public policies that encourage remediation and re-use of brownfields. Our survey 
instrument was administered in person to a sample of respondents intercepted at random at the 
MIPIM annual conference in Cannes, France, on March 12-15, 2002. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
contaminated site must be equal to the full cost of contamination: i.e. the additional development costs—which are 
equal to the cost of cleaning up contamination—plus liability costs.  
20 To interpret the marginal price of the certificate of completion, consider the profit in the presence and absence of 
certification ( p1 and  p0), assuming that certification fully removes liability at a contaminated site. Under this 
assumption,  p1= R -C(Cont=1,X)-L(Cont=1, Cert=1)=R-C(Cont=1,X)-0 and  p0= R -C(Cont=1,X)-L(Cont=1, 
Cert=0)+F. On equating profits under the two alternative scenarios, we find that indifference is reached when 
F=L(Cont=1,Cert=0). Because L(Cont=1,Cert=0) is the liability cost, developers must be offered as much for them 
to give up certification, or are willing to pay as much to secure relief from liability.  Our estimate suggests that on 




  In our conjoint choice experiments, developers a re asked to indicate which they prefer 
among projects characterized by site attributes and policies such as liability relief, flexible 
cleanup standards, fast-track oversight of plans, and subsidies. 
  Our conditional logit models of the responses to the choice questions indicate that 
developers find sites with contamination problems less attractive than others, and that they do 
value liability relief. This confirms our expectation that contaminated sites are less desirable 
because of the associated cleanup  costs, but refutes earlier claims (Urban Institute et al., 1997) 
that liability does not matter.  Our respondents are not deterred by prior contamination, once it 
has been cleaned up, suggesting that “contamination stigma” is not very important, and 
appreciate fast-track review of development and remediation plans, direct financial incentives, 
and flexible (negotiable) cleanup standards.  
  Developers with prior experience with contaminated sites are more responsive to 
financial assistance than all others. T he likelihood of selecting the contaminated site vis-à-vis a 
pristine site increases by roughly 11 percent points for every additional 10-percent subsidies for 
developers with contaminated site experience, but by only 2 percent points for developers 
without contaminated site experience. Those developers who are not experienced with 
contaminated sites are relatively insensitive to subsidies and more responsive to liability relief. 
Similar considerations hold for larger firms. Those developers who sell their  development 
projects, as opposed to using them themselves, appear to value liability relief even more highly. 
  We calculate that for a project worth  €7 million in revenue (the median revenue) 
developers need to be compensated  €2,5 million for them to accept a contaminated site (in the 
absence of other policies), and are willing to give up  €1,5 million to secure a  certificate of 




obtaining approval of cleanup plans is valued  €108,000, while flexible cleanup standards are 
valued €738,000.  
  In sum, our survey data suggest that developers generally  are responsive to policies that 
encourage redevelopment and reuse of brownfields through market mechanisms, such as 
transfers and liability relief, and through regulatory relief. The impact of these policies, however, 
varies with the type o f developer. This information, especially if confirmed by other studies, 
should be useful in recognizing what types of developers respond to brownfield policies and in 
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 Table 1: Descriptive statistics. 
 
  Percent of the sample 
Type of projects   
Industrial (q3ind)  48.97 
Residential (q3res)  53.42 
Commercial (q3com)  73.97 
Offices (q3off)  68.15 
Other (q3oth)  25.09 
Sell (sell1)  64.85 
Keep (keep1)  38.23 
Lease (lease1)  26.96 
Geography   
South Europe (south_eu)  57.88 
North Europe (north_eu)  30.14 
West Europe (west_eu)  61.64 
East Europe (east_eu)  35.62 
North America (north_am)  16.84 
Asia (asia)  8.90 
Rest of the World (rest_of)  8.25 
Typical project   
Minimum land area of project (q1amin)  231,868 m
2 
Minimum building of project (q1bmin)  29,160 m
2 
Minimum revenue of project (q2min)   € 666,324,069 
Experience   
Experience with industrial area (q5)  66.21 
Experience with contaminated site (q6)  46.76 
Abandoned area (q5aban)  59.90 
Still used area (q5used)  67.71 
Familiarity with legislation (familiar)  76.98 
Has ever received govt financial incentives (benefit)  39.31 
Characteristics of the respondent    
Visitor (q9)  51.45 
Exhibitor (q9)  48.55 
Male (q15)  82.00 
Age (q17)  42 
Makes decision (q13)  78.97 
Gathers information for (q14)  93.75 
College degree (university)  88.19 
MBA (mba)  2.78 
Master’s degree, phd and post graduate 
(masters_degree_or_phd) 
7.64 
Employees (q11)  3,733 





Table 2: Comparison between developers with and without prior experience with contaminated sites for 
selected variables. 
 
  Experience with contaminated 
sites (137 respondents) 
No experience with 
contaminated sites (156 
respondents) 
Company characteristics 
Minimum land area of project 
(square meters) 
298,000  137,500 
Size of buildings 
(square meters) 
36,667  22,782 
Minimum revenue from 
project (million euro) 
Median €13.2 million 
Mean €496 million 
Median €5.7 million 
Mean €869 million 
Primary activity of firm 
        Commercial projects 
        Office buildings 
        Residential projects 
        Industrial projects 



















Table 3: Basic Model.  
 
  (1) 
Complete Sample 
2303 obs. 






Private Firms*  
1886 obs. 
Log L=-1310.974     
(4) 
Private Firms, No 
Consultants,* 1542 obs. 
Log L=-1072.166     















































































































Table 4: Conditional Logit Models with Interactions between attributes and experience with contaminated 
sites.  Cleaned sample only, respondents who exhibited preference reversals excluded. N=2239. 
 
  Coefficient  T statistic 
Site characteristics 
CONTAM_P  -1.2102  -2.532 
CONTAM_C  0.2171  0.462 
CONTAM_A  0.1968  0.424 
HIGHWAY  -2.4220  -1.802 
PORT  0.2164  4.658 
RAILROAD   2.0647  1.650 
AIRPORT  0.3186  3.697 
CITYPRES  1.0657  14.159 
Policies  
INCENT  0.0119  2.177 
CERTIFIC  0.5836  5.771 
OVERS  -0.0471  -8.765 
FLEXSTDS  0.3513  3.543 
Interaction terms 
INCENT·experienced 
with contaminated sites 
0.0335  4.600 
CONTAM_P·experienced 
with contaminated sites 
0.2654  1.642 
CERTIFIC·experienced 
with contaminated sites 
0.0145  0.099 
OVERS·Experienced 
with contaminated sites 
0.0085  1.151 
FLEXSTDS·Experienced 
with contaminated sites 
-0.1444  -1.053 







Table 5: Conditional Logit Models with Interactions between attributes and large firms.  Cleaned sample 
only, respondents who exhibited preference reversals excluded. N=2239. 
 
  Coefficient  T statistic 
Attributes 
CONTAM_P  -1.0200  -2.143 
CONTAM_C  0.2652  0.563 
CONTAM_A  0.2350  0.502 
HIGHWAY  -2.0942  -1.562 
PORT  0.4086  4.595 
RAILROAD   1.6652  1.335 
AIRPORT  0.3136  3.650 
CITYPRES  1.0565  14.101 
Policies 
INCENT  0.0347  6.752 
CERTIFIC  0.6076  6.678 
OVERS  -0.0472  -9.637 
FLEXSTDS  0.2802  3.242 
Interaction Terms 
INCENT·Large firm  -0.0205  -2.767 
CONTAM_P·large firm  0.0142  0.087 
CERTIFIC·Large firm  -0.1033  -0.697 
OVERS·large firm  0.0144  1.881 
FLEXSTDS·large firm  0.0278  0.193 







Table 6: Conditional Logit Models with Interactions between attributes and other activities of the firm.   
Cleaned sample, respondents who exhibited preference reversals excluded. N=2239. T statistics in 
parentheses. 
 
  A  B  C 








































































CONTAM_P·SELL1  0.1551 
(0.955) 
   
CERTIFIC·SELL1  0.4054 
(2.912) 
   
CONTAM_P·primary activity is residential 
projects 
  0.1226 
(0.608) 
 
CONTAM_P·primary activity is industrial 
projects 
    0.1761 
(0.841) 






Table 7: Conditional Logit Models with Interactions between attributes and familiarity with legislation 
regarding contaminated sites. Cleaned sample, respondents who exhibited preference reversals 
excluded. N=2239. 
 
  Coefficient  T statistic 
Attributes 
CONTAM_P  -1.1925  -2.459 
CONTAM_C  0.2706  0.576 
CONTAM_A  0.2408  0.515 
HIGHWAY  -2.3566  -1.723 
PORT  0.4205  4.723 
RAILROAD   1.9185  1.504 
AIRPORT  0.3047  3.539 
CITYPRES  1.0611  14.172 
Policies 
INCENT  0.0275  6.276 
CERTIFIC  0.7784  6.131 
OVERS  -0.0511  -8.115 
FLEXSTDS  0.4706  4.136 
Interaction Terms 
CONTAM_P·Familiarity  0.2571  1.519 
CERTIFIC·Familiarity  -0.3014  -1.999 
OVERS·Familiarity  0.0134  1.834 
FLEXSTDS·Familiarity  -0.2791  -2.018 





Table 8. Probability of selecting the contaminated site vis-à-vis a pristine site.  
Site A=contaminated site with policy incentives. Site B=pristine site with no policy incentives. 
 
Probability of selecting A over B (Percent) 
Policy incentive 
























27.33  33.43  21.62  25.00  28.74 
20% financial 
assistance 
33.10  44.19  23.70  27.75  36.33 
Liability relief 
alone  
33.67  36.74  30.50  32.37  34.35 
20% financial 
assistance + 
liability relief  
46.76  59.01  35.77  38.87  51.16 
Flexible cleanup 
standards 



















Table 9. Marginal prices in million of euros, based on the median project value (€ 7 million). 



































































Site choice  
Now, we would like to ask you to choose between two hypothetical areas to develop. For each question, you will be 
described two hypothetical sites and will be asked to choose which one you believe is the more attractive of these 
two sites, based on the characteristics of the site.  
In answering the following questions, please imagine that you are considering development projects of value/size 
similar to those of your company’s typical project. The development project will be in the country or countries 
where your company generally does its business. Please be assured that your answers will be kept strictly 
confidential.   
 
CHOICE 1 
Attributes  SITE A  Site B 
Site contamination  Present  Present 
Transportation network available 
within 20 km  
Highway  Highway and railroad 
Certificate of no further action  Yes  No 
Oversight by government agency 
Response to developer’s application 
within 6 months 
Response to developer’s application 
within 6 months 
Cleanup standards  Flexible  Flexible 
City within 20 km  Present  Present 
Government financial incentives as 
% of the value of the project 
20%   10%  
 
 
Which project do you find more attractive between A and B?  
 
A ￿    B ￿     
 
If you were to choose between A, B, and the option of not participating in either of the two projects, which would 
you choose?   
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